Pareto undominated allocation by strategy-proof mechanisms

AGUSTÍN G. BONIFACIO

Buenos Aires

Congreso; Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society; 2017

Universidad de San Andrés

We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with a social endowmentof perfectly divisible commodities, multidimensional single-peaked preferences, and any finite number of agents. Using the property of multidimensional replacement monotonicity, we are able to: (i) establish sufficient conditions for a rule to be Pareto undominated strategy-proof (Anno and Sasaki, 2013); (ii) present a multidimensional version of the ?sequential rules? introduced by Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997) and show that they are Pareto undominated strategy-proof; and (iii) give a new characterization of the ?multidimensional uniform rule? (Amorós, 2002). Results (i) and (iii) generalize previous work of Anno and Sasaki (2013), that only applies to the two-agent case.