The M-Core. Definition and axiomatic characterization

J. C. CESCO

Bogotá, Colombia

Congreso; Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society (LAMES); 2007

Sociedad Econometrica

In this note we introduce a core-type solution for games with transferableutilities (T U-games), theM-core, whose elements are pairs (x, B) of vectorsand minimal balanced families of coalitions. It extends the notion of theclassical core and is non-empty for any T U -game. We provide an axiomaticcharacterization in terms of the four axioms NE, IR, SU P A and W RGP(with appropriate modifications to adapt them to the new framework) usedin Peleg (1992) to characterize the classical core, plus an additional one,the axiom of equal opportunity (EO), introduced to take account the secondargument of the elements of theM-core. To get our main result, an auxiliarysolution has been introduced which is, in turn, characterized by the same fouraxioms as the classical core was in Peleg (1992) provided a slightly differentformulation is considered for both SU P A and W RGP within the class ofnon-balanced games.