IMASL   20939
INSTITUTO DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS "PROF. EZIO MARCHI"
Unidad Ejecutora - UE
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Efficiency among strategy-proof rules: several commodities and agents with single-peaked preferences
Autor/es:
AGUSTÍN G. BONIFACIO
Lugar:
San Pablo
Reunión:
Workshop; International Workshop on Game Theory and Economic Applications of the Game Theory Society; 2014
Institución organizadora:
Universidad de San Pablo
Resumen:
We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with several perfectly divisible commodities and agents with single- peaked preferences. A rule is "efficient among strategy-proof rules" (Anno and Sasaki, 2013) if it is strategy-proof and it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rule. We show that the uniform allocation rule is the only rule that satisfies efficiency among strategy-proof rules, the equal endowments lower bound and replacement monotonicity. This result extends to arbitrarily many agents the two-agent characterization presented by Anno and Sasaki (2013).