IMASL 20939
INSTITUTO DE MATEMATICA APLICADA DE SAN LUIS "PROF. EZIO MARCHI"
Unidad Ejecutora - UE
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
Autor/es:
R. PABLO ARRIBILLAGA; JORDI MASSO
Lugar:
San Paulo
Reunión:
Workshop; INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY; 2014
Institución organizadora:
Universidad Nacional de San Paulo
Resumen:
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes, the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.
