CORE OF AN INFORMATION TRANSFERAL GAME

GALDEANO, PATRICIA LUCIA; QUINTAS, LUIS GUILLERMO

Punta del Este

Jornada; XII Jornadas latinoamericanas de teoría económica (JOLATE); 2011

Asociacion Latinoamericana de Teoría Económica (ALTE)

ABSTRACTIn this paper we study the Core of a game modelling information transferal. We consider the followingproblem: There are n …rms with similar characteristics; there exists an agent (the innovator) having relevantinformation for the n …rms (the users). The innovator is not going to use the information for himself, buthe could sell it. Firms acquiring the information will be better o¤ than before obtaining it. The problem ismodelled as an (n + 1)�� player cooperative game. We study several properties of this game. We characterizethe Core and we prove it is nonempty. We show that the Shapley Value is in the Core. We also analyze howthe Core changes when the agents are more or less informed.