Clarke, Indiscernibles, and the Fictions of the Imagination. A Commentary

VARGAS, EVELYN

Houston

Congreso; 10th Annual Conference of the Leibniz Society of North America; 2016

LSNA

Much has been saidon the principle of sufficient reason and the principle ofindiscernibles in the correspondence with Clarke.  According to Leibniz, a choice that is not grounded on anyreason contradicts the Principle of Sufficient Reason (=PSR). But a problem has been found in the recent literature on the debate, namely,whether Leibniz was arguing for a contingent version of the PII in an ad hominem fashion. In my commentary, I will examine these twodifferent types of claims. Firstly, I will introduce some remarks concerningLeibniz?s argumentative strategies in debates more generally, then I willtackle the question of the status of the concepts involved in the premises andthe cognitive abilities they require, and finally, I will conclude with thequestion concerning the logical independence of the alleged two arguments.