Leibniz on Subjective Experience and the Formation of Belief

VARGAS, EVELYN

Hannover

Congreso; IX. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress; 2011

Gottfried Wilheim Leibniz Gesellschaft

The epistemological focus of much of recent history of early modern philosophy of mind has encouraged the misreading of substantive claims of their approach to perceptual experience. The idea that modern philosophers introduced the doctrine that in perception we are directly or immediately aware of some sort of inner object that mediates between the knower and the known is representative of this attitude (the so-called 'veil of perception'). Also, it is often assumed that if perceptual beliefs are grounded on those internal mental states, their perceptual doctrines are unable to deliver a satisfactory epistemology since their theories precludes the awareness of external objects. Moreover, it is assumed that those passively received singular items cannot account for our epistemic responsibility, that is, perceptual experience cannot count as a reason for holding a belief. But Leibniz's unique position can challenge these generally accepted views. In this paper I will examine his conceptions of perceptual belief and justification in the context of his anti-skeptical strategies. As a result, the study of the dynamics of the mental and the role of volition in human cognition will contribute to a reassessment of epistemic autonomy according to Leibniz.