Leibniz and Bayle: Two versions of Pyrrhonism

VARGAS, EVELYN

Montreal

Congreso; The Leibniz and Bayle Conference; 2012

Université de Montréal

The relevance of the skeptic tradition in the rise of modern philosophy is widely recognized in recent history of philosophy scholarship. Although the scope of Bayle´s commitment to skepticism is a matter of controversy, the discussion of skeptical themes plays an important role in both Leibniz and Bayle. But before we attempt to propose an interpretation of the significance they attribute to skepticism, we need to clarify what these authors tried to endorse or refute, that is, we need to clarify their conception of Pyrrhonian skepticism. In order to do so, then, I will introduce the concept of Pyrrhonian skepticism as it is described by Sextus Empiricus in his ´Outlines of Pyrrhonism.´ According to Sextus, the skeptic experience involves three moments, equipollence or isostheneia, suspension of judgment or epochê and tranquility or ataraxia. On any particular topic, he wrote, the Pyrrhonist can call into question the adequacy of the reasons in favor of it; so by subverting the reader´s confidence on the topic, the Pyrrhonist can lead the reader to suspend his judgment. In his famous article Bayle defines Pyrrhonism in terms of suspension of judgment while the primary focus of Leibniz's arguments is the skeptic notion of isostheneia, understood as the equilibrium of reasons supporting a given belief. In his 'Specimen animadversionem in Sextum Empiricum' Leibniz denies that evidence achieves an equal balance between opposed and incompatible claims; consequently, the Pyrrhonist's attempt to attain suspension of judgment cannot be sustained. Rather than emphasizing the weakness of human knowledge by raising doubts about the power of reason, as Bayle does, Leibniz would claim that by refuting the skeptic's arguments that call into question our ability to have justified beliefs, our rational credentials for holding beliefs can be restored. I will examine the grounds for this discrepancy by examining their conceptions of belief and doxastic obligations.