Blind Cognitions and Epistemic Responsibility According to Leibniz

VARGAS, EVELYN

Hannover

Congreso; XI International Leibniz Congress ? Le present est plein de l?avenir, et chargé du passé; 2023

The notion of blind cognition (also called symbolic or suppositive) is a fundamental notion of Leibnizian epistemology that the philosopher already mentioned in his Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria (A VI, 1, 170) and developed in his early mathematical investigations (A VII, 6, N 51). Leibniz introduced the notion of blind cognition to account for the knowledge of the ideal objects of mathematics, or more precisely, “to abbreviate the expressions” (Numeri infiniti; A VI, 3, 498). In mathematical reasoning an appropriate sign can represent a complex meaning without invoking the corresponding notions; the symbolic sign has a substitutive role by which reasoning can be performed more easily. But Leibniz also appeals to blind cognitions to account for moral failure because they intervene in practical deliberation which in turn consists in some discursive thinking.  However, this use of blind thoughts seems problematic in at least two ways. While mathematical reasoning aims at discovering or proving mathematical truths, practical deliberations concerns deciding what to do, so that its subject matter is action. Also, it seems that a moral agent could not be blamed or punished for what is not up to her. In this presentation my purpose is to focus on those features of blind thinking that Leibniz found to be both essential to our thinking and the reason of moral failure but do not compromise its epistemic or its moral import. While the goal of belief is truth, practical reasoning must motivate action. As I hope to show, Leibniz both concedes that the motivational aspect of our thinking can shape the reasoning process but also that moral conclusions can motivate action.