Epistemology

TOZZI THOMPSON, VERONICA; PÉREZ, MOIRA

Bloomsbury History: Theory and Method

Bloombsbury

Lugar: Londres; Año: 2021; p. 1 - 28

The etymology of the word "Epistemology" comes from the conjunction of Greek terms "episteme" (knowledge, science) and "logos" (study): it is the ?study of knowledge?. In disciplinary terms, ?epistemology? or ?theory of knowledge? is the branch of philosophy that investigates the possibility of knowing the external world, other minds, oneself, or the past. In its traditional sense, it is a theoretical inquiry into the arguments for or against the distinction between knowledge and mere belief or opinion. The purpose of producing a general theory about what knowledge is, differs from sociological or psychological discussions on the subject.Philosophical tradition has identified in common sense and our ordinary language at least three kinds of knowledge, or situations in which we claim to know: "Knowing that" (?propositional knowledge?), e.g. "Aisha knows that Plato is the author of the Teetetus", "Samar knows that the bus passes by the corner of his house every 10 minutes", "Eleonora knows John Lennon" (in the sense that she knows who he is, his biography); "Knowing how" (?procedural knowledge?), e.g. "Federico is a good joke teller", "Zuri knows how to play chess", "Fateh knows infinitesimal calculation" (in the sense of being a good chess player or exercising calculation, not that they merely know the rules or definition of each); and "Knowing by acquaintance? (?object knowledge"), e.g. "Cassandra knows Apollo", "Francisco knows Cairo" (he was there, he has had some perceptual contact with a certain entity). It is the conditions of "propositional knowledge" that have been the main focus of philosophical discussion, and that will be relevant to our interest in the possibility of historiographical knowledge of the past. A traditional and widely extended definition of "knowing that" as ?true justified belief? gives centrality to the reflection on the very notion of justification. On the one hand, it delves into its foundations by offering two classical positions: Rationalism, according to which knowledge should ultimately be based on reason (normative principles of thought and its rules of inference), and Empiricism, which places the ultimate foundation in what is "given" directly to experience, without distortions or intermediaries. On the other hand, it investigates the various sources of knowledge, their weight and relative reliability: reason, experience, memory, introspection and testimony. Finally, the answers to the first two points regarding our strategies of justification and the sources of our beliefs, are useful to approach the question of whether they provide us with a foundation for our beliefs. At this point, two issues come to the fore: the "foundationalist account of knowledge" and the "skeptical challenge" (Williams 1996, 2001). It is generally accepted by the philosophical community that René Descartes (1596-1650) led an epistemological turn in modern philosophy. Descartes used a skeptical method, questioning every belief received from authorities in order to identify, by means of his own rational faculties, which of them resisted doubt. Although he was not a skeptic, for his aim was to find indubitable beliefs, his inquiry placed the skeptical challenge at the center of epistemological theory, and epistemic autonomy as its ideal: individual rational agents must be epistemically responsible for the justification of their own beliefs.Since then, dismantling the Cartesian romantic plot of fall (in total doubt) and rise (access to the indubitable), that is, the heroic journey from skepticism to foundationalism, continues to haunt epistemology. Examples of this anti-Cartesian movement in contemporary epistemology can be found within Anglo-Saxon philosophy, in Social Epistemology, Feminist Epistemology, Epistemology of Testimony, among others. These movements impugn the individualistic, ahistorical, universalizing treatment of the phenomenon of knowledge by modern epistemology, denouncing that a failure to engage with the social aspects of knowledge production will necessarily result in a narrow and epistemically irresponsible account of cognitive processes, actors, relations and products. Nevertheless, reflections on the skeptical challenge and on the different notions of skepticism as a research method, a substantive thesis or an ethical stance, continue to be explored in the contemporary context. The term ?epistemology? also has a narrower meaning, referred to the creation and justification of knowledge in specific research areas of the sciences (natural, formal, social or human). This includes epistemology of history, i.e. the philosophical reflection on the possibility of reaching true beliefs or justified knowledge about the past. In 1951, William H. Walsh (1913-1986) called it ?critical philosophy of history? (Walsh 1961), and in 2009 Aviezer Tucker suggested the name ?philosophy of historiography?. The field, which must be distinguished from speculative (metaphysical) reflections on the meaning of events themselves, has seen great development in the 20th and 21st Centuries. In this chapter we will fist offer an overview of its now classic debates referred to topics such as explanation vs. understanding, the possibility of knowing the past, or relativism, and then present some of its main approaches from contemporary Social Epistemology. In our view, these are currently the most promising developments this discipline offers for an epistemically responsible and socially committed historiographical practice.