PACHILLA pablo Nicolas
congresos y reuniones científicas
Biting the Bullet. A Vindication of Panpsychism and Correlationism
Workshop; Affektivität Kolloquium; 2019
Institución organizadora:
Freie Universität Berlin
I will argue that there are overlapping claims in Brassier?s and Meillassoux?s critique of Deleuze, and that henceforth we first need to clearly distinguish them. Brassier eminently conflates three stances that are not at all the same: (1) anthropocentrism, (2) vitalism, and (3) panpsychism. Whereas all three must be understood in an ontological (and not an ethical) way, by ?anthropocentrism? we understand the claim that only humans bring about reality; by ?vitalism,? the claim that only organic life?such as modern biology conceives of it?brings about reality; by ?panpsychism,? that everything has at least an elementary form of mind. All three are forms of ?correlationism,? since they presuppose that reality is someone?s of something?s experience. However, while the scope of beings able to have experience at all is limited in the first and second case?to humans and organisms, respectively?, it is unlimited in the last case. The issue of extension, however, hides a more profound difference: it is only by taking the last claim that one could hold that experience and reality are not two different things, such as Speculative Realism would have us believe. If we hold (a) or (b), then we are assuming that there exists something other than the experiencer, viz. an experienced mindless reality that includes both non-human living beings and non-living things in the first case, and only non-living things in the second. If we do not restrict the ability of experiencing to certain particular beings, however, then the possibility remains open to construe the relationship between matter and mind in such a way as to make them ?correlative? in an internal manner. This is what I will attempt to do, by means of an account of Deleuze?s second chapter of Difference and Repetition.