Enough physicalism

PÉREZ, DIANA

Villa Giardino, Córdoba

Workshop; Segundo Taller sobre Lenguaje, Contexto y Cognición; 2008

Kim's last book, Physicalism or something near enough like the previous one, Mind in a physical world, are attempts to defend the physicalist thesis in our dualistic and confused philosophical world. The enterprise is not easy, because many things have been written against each possible form of physicalism, and so many different versions of physicalism are in the offing. Chapters 4 and 5 of Kim's last book are an attempt to argue against two versions of physicalism: contingent identity physicalism, and a posteriori necessary identity physicalism. In a subtle way, this attack implies a defense of Kim's own reductive functionalism. My proposal is to accept Kripkean identities (against Kim) but conceding that they don't suffice for closing the gap: an interesting physicalist theory requires also an explanation of the special nature of our irreducible and ineliminable folk psychological concepts.