The Challenge of Managing Artisanal Fisheries Embedded in Protected Areas-Valdes Peninsula (Argentine Patagonia) as a Complex Commons

A. CINTI; A.M. PARMA; J.M. (LOBO) ORENSANZ; F. MARIN

Edmonton

Conferencia; 15th Biennial Global Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons; 2015

University of Alberta

The theory of the commons was initially constructed on the basis of relatively simple cases, e.g. single common pool resources (CPRs) and user groups, placinga strong emphasis on local dynamics. The applicability of the theory on the factors likely to affect sustainability to more complex situations (e.g. multiplicity ofuser groups, common-pool resources and legal frameworks), has been questioned and is gaining increased scholarly attention. Small-scale fisheries occurring inside protected areas, a frequent situation in Latin America, are typical examples of complex commons. Here we analyze the case of diving and hand-gathering shellfisheries that operate within the boundaries of the multiple-use Valdes Peninsula Protected Area (VPPA, Argentine Patagonia), a UNESCO World Heritage Site. From the perspective of a simple CPR, these fisheries exhibit many conditions conducive to sustainability: [i] clearly bound region; [ii] geographical setting that facilitates enforcement;[iii] small number of users; [iv]constructive relationship between technical staff of management agencies, organized fishers and scientists consolidated over the years; [v] related to the latter, collaborative monitoring and design of management regulations, including exclusive access rights. Yet, achieving biological, economic and institutional sustainability has proved elusive. In this contribution we address this apparent paradox. Protected areas entail a significant role for government agencies, as management authority tends to be retained rather than devolved to users. In the case of the VPPA, multiple coexisting CPRs and corresponding user groups, involving extractive (fishing) and non-extractive (conservation, recreation) uses, are mapped into authorities with overlapping (even conflictive) mandates and poor coordination. Attempts at inter-agency coordination in a variety of ambits, in some cases with users´ participation (a frequent prescription), have been discontinuous due to political instability and proved ineffectual. The agenda has been dominated by the priorities of the conservation, landowners and tourism sectors, better positioned institutionally and politically. The end result has been the dilution of responsibility and lack of political will to address the fisheries issues on the side of the management authorities. This is felt mostly in the case of politically costly aspects of implementation, like enforcement. On the other hand, the potential for collective action by the fishers is weakened by their lack of cohesiveness resulting from issues of legitimacy. Access is regulated by the fisheries authority. Permits are granted to users that are expected to be legitimate according to the law. Legitimacy is however difficult to formalize and enforce, opening the door to flagrantly illegitimate users. We conclude that conditions potentially enabling sustainability are disabled by the dilution of responsibility on the side of the multiple management agencies, and the erosion of incentives for self-organizationof the users, as the government retains authority but is incapable to exercise it.