Reasons for Action and Defeasibility

MARIA CRISTINA REDONDO (AUTORA)

The Logic of Legal Requirements. Essays on Defeasibility

Oxford University Press

Lugar: Oxford; Año: 2012; p. 309 - 323

The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse the following issue: can reasons for action be defeasible? In order to answer this question, this essay is primarily devoted to a careful reflection on both the concept of defeasibility (first part) and the concept of reason for action (second part). I try to show that depending on what conception we adopt we will obtain two distinct answers to the initial question. The nature of the defeasibility problem is undoubtedly controversial. In any case, even though agreement may be reached regarding a common concept of defeasibility, two competing conceptions of this notion remain in play. I discuss in which of these conceptions it is possible to say that reasons for action are defeasible. As I try to show, this depends on which presuppositions on the nature of reasons we assume.