The Private Language Arguments

KARCZMARCZYK, PEDRO

Turku, Finlandia

Conferencia; Research Seminar in Philosophy; 2010

Department of philosophy, Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finladia.

This paper tries to reconstruct the controversy on the possibility of private language. First, we analyze “epistemological” trends in the argument (Malcolm, Fogelin) showing their failures. Then, we analyze “semantic” versions (Kenny, Tugendhat) finding they are also failed. Barry Stroud’s criticism of transcendental arguments as refutations of scepticism allows us to discern the common presupposition that weakens these versions. Moreover, this reconstruction allows us to see how Kripke’s deals with the problem of the previous discussion in order to avoid committing himself with this presupposition. We consider Kripke’s Wittgenstein version to be the only consistent version of the argument. We use our reconstruction to afford two of the most important criticisms directed against Kripke’s Wittgenstein: The problem of objectivity of the rule: Can a single individual be right in contradicting communal assent?; and the problem of internal relationships between rules and their applications, allegedly violated because of the role played by communal agreement.