Private Language and Truth Conditions

KARCZMARCZYK, PEDRO

Viena

Conferencia; Wittgenstein Seminar; 2010

Institüt für Philosophie, Universität Wien

This paper deals with the controversy on the possibility of private language. We classify different trends in the interpretation of the argument; ?epistemological? trends (Malcolm, Fogelin); ?semantic? versions (Kenny, Tugendhat) showing their failures. Then, we analyze Barry Stroud?s criticism of transcendental arguments as refutations of scepticism which allows us to discern the common presupposition that weakens these versions. The key movement in Barry Stroud´s argument is that after the transcendental and linguistically grounded refutation of scepticism the sceptic can distinguish between truth conditions and conditions of warranted of justified use. The sceptic declares to be committed to the former, which makes the logical space to simultaneously speak with meaning declaring not to know empirical claims. This reconstruction of previous discussions give us, we argue, the right perspective to appreciate the argument of Kripke´s Wittgenstein in terms of an attack to meaning truth conditions, rejected as impossible, elucidating meaning discourse only in terms of conditions of justified use or assertability conditions.