Defensa del universalismo kantiano en el contexto del pensamiento ético contemporáneo

CRELIER, PABLO ANDRÉS

Logos. Revista de Filosofía

Universidad La Salle

Lugar: México D. F.; Año: 2006 p. 9 - 36

1665-8620

Este trabajo defiende la perspectiva ética universalista kantiana frente a una serie de propuestas contemporáneas que asignan valor a lo particular en ocasiones de una manera unilateral, lo cual conduce, como se intenta mostrar, a una serie de paradojas, falacias y aporías. La opción universalista, sin embargo, también se enfrenta con problemas, particularmente con el “rigorismo” a menudo reprochado a Kant. Se propone salvar la perspectiva kantiana señalando que el problema del universalismo no es la exigencia rigorista de aplicación incondicional de las normas, sino la falta de especificación que dichas normas suelen tener. Abstract: A Defense of Kantian Universalism in the Context of the Contemporary Ethical Thinking This paper upholds the Kantian ethical universalism against some recent tendencies in moral philosophy which bestow moral value upon single entities. When these tendencies become one-sided they get into paradoxes, fallacies and aporias. However, the universalist point of view confronts the accusation of “rigorism”, a charge often brought against Kant. It is hold that the rigorist demand of an unconditional application of moral norms does not mean a difficulty to universalism, whose main problem lies in the insufficiently specified character those norms often have.  Abstract: A Defense of Kantian Universalism in the Context of the Contemporary Ethical Thinking This paper upholds the Kantian ethical universalism against some recent tendencies in moral philosophy which bestow moral value upon single entities. When these tendencies become one-sided they get into paradoxes, fallacies and aporias. However, the universalist point of view confronts the accusation of “rigorism”, a charge often brought against Kant. It is hold that the rigorist demand of an unconditional application of moral norms does not mean a difficulty to universalism, whose main problem lies in the insufficiently specified character those norms often have.