Grounded truth and non-categoricity

GALLOVICH, CAMILA

Buenos Aires

Workshop; I Workshop NUS - BA Logic; 2023

National University of Singapore & IIF-Sadaf-CONICET

There are two fundamental ideas about truth that any theory seeking to provide a natural and explanatory account of this concept should be able to capture. The first idea suggests that the meaning of the truth predicate is given by the claim that the circumstances under which one may assert of a sentence that it is true (false) are exactly the same as the circumstances under which one may assert (deny) that sentence. According to the second idea, the interpretation of the sentences containing semantic predicates is determined by the interpretation of those sentences that do not contain these predicates. Whereas the first thought is silent on how to establish an appropriate extension for the concept of truth, the second thought commits one to the idea that the truth predicate has an intended interpretation. In “Kripke and the logic of Truth”, Kremer has raised an objection against Kripke’s proposal. According to this objection, the fixed-point theory fails to simultaneously capture both semantic intuitions without sacrificing a good part of its explanatory power. My first goal in this talk is to analyze this objection and to provide a response to it by making use of the fixed-point semantics. My second goal is to argue that, pace Kremer, a further problem emerges against his own inferentialist approach to truth, as the rules associated with this concept prove not to be sufficient to rule out unintended interpretations. I will also suggest that a promising strategy to address this concern emerges by making use of a bilateralist system.