A Pragmatic Account of Rigidity

EDUARDO GARCÍA RAMÍREZ

Valparaíso

Workshop; VI Workshop on Language, Context and Cognition; 2017

Universidad Alberto Hurtado

Kripke's (1980) theory of rigid designation provides a simple semantic account of modal intuitions about statements involving proper names. On this view proper names are rigid designators and statements involving them observe the rule of rigidity. This view has at least three problems. First, it does not tell us in virtue of what proper names are rigid. Second, it has metaphysically dubious commitments that are unwarranted for a linguistic theory. And, third, it fails to properly account for the intuitions of contingent identity. I want to address these worries by offering a pragmatic account of rigidity. The resulting view addresses all three problems just mentioned. This account is our best option when it comes to understanding rigidity. I conclude by considering some of the substantial philosophical consequences of accepting this alternative account.