On Rigidifying

EDUARDO GARCÍA RAMÍREZ

Boston

Workshop; MIT Summer Workshop on Philosophy of Language; 2016

Department of Philosophy and Linguistics, MIT

<!-- /* Font Definitions */@font-face{font-family:"ＭＳ 明朝";mso-font-charset:78;mso-generic-font-family:auto;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:1 134676480 16 0 131072 0;}@font-face{font-family:"Cambria Math";panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:auto;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1107305727 0 0 415 0;}@font-face{font-family:Cambria;panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:auto;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1073743103 0 0 415 0;} /* Style Definitions */p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal{mso-style-unhide:no;mso-style-qformat:yes;mso-style-parent:"";margin:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Cambria;mso-ascii-font-family:Cambria;mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"ＭＳ 明朝";mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast;mso-hansi-font-family:Cambria;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD;}span.msoIns{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-style-name:"";text-decoration:underline;text-underline:single;color:teal;}.MsoChpDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-default-props:yes;font-family:Cambria;mso-ascii-font-family:Cambria;mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"ＭＳ 明朝";mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast;mso-hansi-font-family:Cambria;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD;}@page WordSection1{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;margin:70.85pt 3.0cm 70.85pt 3.0cm;mso-header-margin:36.0pt;mso-footer-margin:36.0pt;mso-paper-source:0;}div.WordSection1{page:WordSection1;}--><!-- /* Font Definitions */@font-face{font-family:"ＭＳ 明朝";mso-font-charset:78;mso-generic-font-family:auto;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:1 134676480 16 0 131072 0;}@font-face{font-family:"Cambria Math";panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:auto;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1107305727 0 0 415 0;}@font-face{font-family:Cambria;panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:auto;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1073743103 0 0 415 0;} /* Style Definitions */p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal{mso-style-unhide:no;mso-style-qformat:yes;mso-style-parent:"";margin:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Cambria;mso-ascii-font-family:Cambria;mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"ＭＳ 明朝";mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast;mso-hansi-font-family:Cambria;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD;}.MsoChpDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-default-props:yes;font-family:Cambria;mso-ascii-font-family:Cambria;mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"ＭＳ 明朝";mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast;mso-hansi-font-family:Cambria;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD;}@page WordSection1{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;margin:70.85pt 3.0cm 70.85pt 3.0cm;mso-header-margin:36.0pt;mso-footer-margin:36.0pt;mso-paper-source:0;}div.WordSection1{page:WordSection1;}-->Competent speakers commonly use ordinary proper names (i.e., names of persons,geographical locations, ordinary objects, etc.), demonstratives, and definitedescriptions to refer to some individual person, location, or object in thecourse of doing what is normally understood as making a modal claim about a person,location, or object. The way in which these expressions are used to make modalclaims, and what this use says about the nature of such expressions, has beenthe subject of much discussion in the philosophy of language. This isparticularly so when it comes to accounting for the intuitions that competentspeakers have about the truth conditions of such statements. I shall call these "modal intuitions".It is fair to say that Kripke´s theory of rigidity is widely accepted among philosophers asoffering the best and most intuitive account of competent speaker´s modal intuitions. According to this theory, rigidity is a semantic property property of a restricted kind of expression, one that includes ordinary proper names, and perhaps natural kind terms, butnot definite descriptions.  In this paper I want to offer an alternative account. Inspired in both Kripke's and Lewis´ theories, the account I want to offer intends to be an improvementon both. Like Kripke's, the account is based on the notion of rigidity. Like Lewis', the account is flexible enough to account for contingent identitystatements involving proper names. Still, unlike Lewis´ quasi-rigidity or Kripke's rigidity, this account does not offer support for de re modality. On this view, rigidity is not a property of a given kind of expression but ofcertain uses of some expressions,  and the relevant modal intuitionsaccurately portray the truth-value of such statements even if they do notaccurately portray the way in which these depend upon properties of the relevant objects.