On the criticism of the noematic presentation of alterity in Michel Henry from the perspective of the phenomenology of the inapparent

HERNÁN INVERSO

Dublín

Congreso; International Philosophy Conference Phenomenology, Empathy, Intersubjectivity: New Approaches; 2017

Royal Irish Academy

Michel Henry questions the notion of subject and objects, on the one hand, its linkage with representation and, on the other hand, the description of alterity seen from an intentional perspective. He tries to show in what sense intentionality and constitution are not adequate phenomenological ways in the task to explain the universal a priori of the experience of alterity. Indeed, this critic of the notion of subject does not only questions the noematic presentations of alterity, but affects any attempt to account for the Other from a perspective that is not self-affective. However, what at first sight seems irreconcilable with the husserlian phenomenological horizon, can be a substantive contribution in this same area. We will examine here Henry?s criticism on the husserlian position in order to provide a reading key that does not provoke a collision between them, but a synergy that, retaking the power of origins, deploys a research program that encompasses the study of the whole spectrum of phenomena.