Is it rational to maintain beliefs caused by education? (or, Rorty?s ethnocentrism as an excuse for yet-another-text on moral scepticism)

CLAUDIO CORMICK

Córdoba

Congreso; Fourth International Colloquium on Pragmatism; 2018

Universidad Nacional de Córdoba

In this work, we will attempt to try to connect G. A. Cohen?s cases of conflict between different subjects? ?nurtured beliefs?, which lead to so-called ?paradoxes of conviction?, on the one hand, with the kind of disagreements that Bernard Williams labels ?notional confrontations? and to which Rorty applies an overtly ?ethnocentric? strategy, on the other hand. As is known, Rorty?s ethnocentrism is characterised by a distinctive approach to the problem of conflicting moral identities, which shares with Cohen the acknowledgment of contingent social-historical influences but which, unlike the approach adopted by the Canadian philosopher, insists that learning about such contingency does not require any weakening of our convictions. Given that Cohen?s paradoxes involve both highly theoretical and ethical-political beliefs, and given that discussion in the specific literature has mainly focused on the former, we will be able to shed more light on the latter by means of referring to the kind of debates Rorty imagines between believers in liberal democracy and Nazis or religious fundamentalists. However, in order to ?apply? Rorty?s ethnocentrism to Cohen?s cases, it will be necessary, first, to clarify the neopragmatist?s sketchy and rather obscure use of normative terms. As it is known, Rorty insists that his own liberal beliefs are ?better? than those of his adversaries, while conceding nonetheless that he cannot prove them better on non-circular grounds. Consequently, we will try to reconstruct Rorty?s ethnocentrism on the basis of what the American philosopher declares about the possibilities of rational belief change.