El problema de la racionalidad y el debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos. Una intervención a propósito del debate entre Williams y Goldman

CLAUDIO CORMICK

Philosophia. Revista de Filosofía

Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo

Lugar: Mendoza; Año: 2019

0328-9672

[Philosophia se encuentra indizada en The Philosopher´s Index, REDIB, Latindex, y Gale Cengage Learning- Informe Académico].Abstract. In this work, we will focus on the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism, starting from the debate between Michael Williams and Alvin Goldman, as it appears in their exchange of texts in the 2016 volume Goldman and his critics. We will provide a context for this discussion by means of pointing out that, whereas a series of authors (in particular, Laurence BonJour and, after his tracks, Jennifer Lackey and Fernando Broncano) extract from the internalism/externalism debate the ?dualistic? consequence according to which knowledge cannot be analysed from only one perspective, but there exist at least two?that of subjective rationality and that of conduciveness to truth?, Goldman appears on the contrary as a ?hard line? externalist for whom internalism is simply untenable and thus epistemic justification is to be understood exclusively in reliabilist terms. Against this background, we will analyse Williams? proposal. On the one hand, this author attempts to prove that Goldman?s criticisms of internalism are limited to only a ?mentalistic? or ?subjectivistic? version of it. On the other hand, he seeks to vindicate a moderate internalist epistemology by relying on the tenet that human knowledge is indissociably linked to considerations of accountability. We will try to show that Goldman?s reply, which is focused on denouncing an alleged confusion by Williams between the problem of ?justifiedness? and the problem of ?justification?, does not do justice to the real scope of the question of epistemic justification, once this question is analysed, not on the basis of alleged ?intuitions? about the meaning of ?knowledge? in ordinary language, but on the basis of practices in which such notions can operate.