Functional Attribution in Biochemistry and Molecular Biology

ALLEVA, KARINA; BARBERIS, SERGIO; ROFFÉ, ARIEL JONATHAN; GINNOBILI, SANTIAGO

Buenos Aires

Congreso; 17th CLMPST; 2023

CLMPST

The exponential accumulation of sequenced genomes and gene products, and the study of their biological roles, has raised concerns about communication among members of the scientific community. This, in turn, has led to philosophical discussions in the field, many of which have been raised by the same practicing scientists (e.g., Greenspan, 2011). These include the need for a consistent use of functional language and of a proper metatheoretical understanding of functional attribution.Traditional accounts of biological function have sought to explicitly define the concept of function. Although not everyone agrees that this is possible (e.g., Neander, 1991), explicitly defining the concept implies finding a unified set of necessary, sufficient and operational conditions for an effect of a trait to count as a function. Since defined concepts are eliminable, providing such a definition in terms of non-functional concepts may be tempting if one has metaphysical concerns about teleology.In recent years, a number of authors have advanced pluralist positions, arguing that different concepts of function are used in different contexts. Some have held that pluralism occurs between disciplines, while others have argued that even within a single discipline different notions of function are sometimes at stake (e.g., Cusimano & Sterner, 2019).In this talk we will attempt to reframe the debate about whether a single or multiple concepts of function are used in molecular biology. Our approach will be to treat functional language similarly to the language of any other scientific field. In this sense, we expect to find what the logical empiricists knew from early on: that theoretical concepts are neither explicitly definable nor eliminable (at least by their criteria of determination, see Hempel, 1958). We will leave aside metaphysical concerns about teleology and focus only on the way in which functional attribution takes place.Following Olmos (2018), who has studied the operationalization criteria for functions in ethology, we will analyze some case studies from molecular biology and biochemistry to show that a heterogeneous collection of evidence is typically used to attribute functions to gene products. We will argue that there is a single concept of function that has many determination/operationalization methods (none of which is sufficient or necessary by itself) that together specify (at least part of) its empirical meaning. Our case analyses will also show that some sources of evidence (e.g. comparative), that are widely used in biological practice, have been ignored, even by the pluralists.ReferencesCusimano, S., & Sterner, B. (2019). Integrative pluralism for biological function. Biology & Philosophy, 34(6), 55.Greenspan, N. S. (2011). Attributing functions to genes and gene products. Trends in Biochemical Sciences, 36(6), 293–297.Hempel, C. G. (1958). The Theoretician’s Dilemma. In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol. 2). University of Minnesota Press.Neander, K. (1991). Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defense. Philosophy of Science, 58(2), 168–184.Olmos, A. S. (2018). El concepto de función y la explicación funcional de la neuroetología. Teseo Press.