INVESTIGADORES
PRINGLES Rolando Marcelo
artículos
Título:
Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets
Autor/es:
DR.-ING. FERNANDO OLSINA; DR.-ING. ROLANDO PRINGLES; DR.-ING. CARLOS LARISON; DR.-ING. FRANCISCO GARCÉS
Revista:
ENERGY POLICY
Editorial:
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
Referencias:
Lugar: Amsterdam; Año: 2014
ISSN:
0301-4215
Resumen:
Electric power is a
critical input to modern economies. Generation adequacy and security of supply in
power systems running under competition are currently topics of high concern for
consumers, Regulators and governments. In a market setting, generation investments
and adequacy can only be achieved by an appropriate regulatory framework that sets
efficient remuneration to power capacity. Theoretically, energy-only electricity
markets are efficient and no additional mechanism is needed. Nonetheless, the energy-only
market design suffers from serious drawbacks. Therefore, jointly with the evolution
of electricity markets, many remunerating mechanisms for generation capacity have
been proposed. Explicit capacity payment was the first remunerating approach implemented
and perhaps still the most applied. However, this price-based regulation has been
applied no without severe difficulties and criticism. In this paper, a new reliability
payment mechanism is envisioned. Capacity of each generating unit is paid according
to its effective contribution to overall system reliability. The proposed scheme
has many attractive features and preserves the theoretical efficiency
properties of energy-only markets. Fairness, incentive compatibility, market power
mitigation and settlement rules are investigated in this work. The article also
examines the requirements for system data and models in order to implement the proposed
capacity mechanism. A numerical example on a real hydrothermal system serves
for illustrating the practicability of the proposed approach and the resulting reliability
payments to the generation units.