INVESTIGADORES
DIMITRIU Cristian
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Rawls and a Global Difference Principle
Autor/es:
CRISTIAN DIMITRIU
Lugar:
Montreal, Canada
Reunión:
Conferencia; Concordia Graduate Conference; 2007
Institución organizadora:
Concordia University - Department of Philosophy
Resumen:
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