Moderate Epsitemic Akrasia and Doxsatic Rationality

NICOLÁS LO GUERCIO

Congreso; Cuarto Coloquio de Jóvenes Investigadores en Filosofía Analítica; 2016

Moderate epistemic akrasia involves an agent that believes `p, but I suspend judgment about whether my evidence supports p?. In this article I?ll defend that it is never doxastically rational to be moderately akratic. After a brief introduction, I?ll first clarify the notion of suspension of judgment I?ll work with. Then I?ll recall the well-known distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality, and I?ll discuss some cases of improper basing. Finally, I?ll stipulate three plausible circumstances in which it might be rational to suspend judgment about whether it is rational to believe a proposition. Finally, I?ll argue that in none of those cases moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically rational.