Espejos y máscaras. Los peligros de un arte de artistas

FLEISNER, PAULA

MORPHEUS

Unirio

Lugar: Rio de Janeiro; Año: 2005 p. 1 - 8

1676-2924

[REVISTA MORPHEUS PUBLICACIÓN CON REFERATO INTERNACIONAL INDEXADA EN LATINDEX Catálogo] Resumen: Plato is horrified by mirrors, those prolongers of the vain and uncertain world. He fears that, looking through them or making us look through them, anyone may think of himself as a demiurge, a maker of all things. He is worried about the confusion or the elimination of all the distinctions to which he dedicated his writings. Truth, lie; essence, appearance; model, copy: these are the philosophical dichotomies that the poetic art refuses to respect. Plato knows that the power of art is so strong that it could drive the strongest foundations of a polis to ruins. Nietzsche understands this horror very well, because he understands and shares the Platonic idea of art as non-serious and pervert creation of images. However, he does not condemn that lying human ability; instead he celebrates it with gratitude. Far from the modern aesthetic for men of taste that with its notions of desinterest and aesthetic pleasure guarantees a peaceful coexistence between art and philosophy, Nietzsche returns to the Greek experience of art and defends that superficial creation, that provisory adoption of masks, that art for lying artists, plunderers and jesters. In this paper I propose to review the conception of art implicit in the Platonic condemnation (carried out in Republic III and X, and in Laws II) in relation to the Nietzschean defense of art as a remedy against the Truth.