Creating artifactual kinds

LAWLER, DIEGO Y VEGA, JESÚS

Delft University of Technology

Workshop; Workshop Engineering Artefact Kinds; 2009

Delft University of Technology. Department of Philosophy

Two different theoretical frameworks have been proposed to account for the nature of artifacts and artifactual kinds: one of them views artifacts as functional objects; the other regards artifacts as constituted by the concepts and intentions of makers. The functional view classifies artifacts in terms of the thing they do, that is, the functions they perfom. The historical-intentional view defends that an artifact being a member of a kind depends on having been created with the intention of being the object that really is. One of the constraints to be met by any theory of artifacts is the explanation of the possibility of innovation, that is, of introducing newly created artifactual kinds. It has been argued that only intentional views are able to explain this feature. However, we will show that intentional theories also encounter some troubles in explaining how new artifactual kinds come into being. Firstly, we will present some objections to the intentional view recently argued by A. Thomasson. Secondly, we will make an attempt for broadly delineating the contours of a view which could overcome some of these difficulties.