Self-knowledge on beliefs: two intuitions

LAWLER, DIEGO

University of Warwick, Reino Unido

Workshop; Workshop on Philosophy of Mind and Epistemology; 2007

Philosophy Department, University of Warwick

The notion of first-person authority has been the topic of much debate in recent discussions of self-knowledge. It refers to that authority that we enjoy in beliefs about, and knowledge of certain of our mental states. The mental states in question are beliefs, other propositional attitudes and certain sensations. Common examples of first-person authority are such pieces of knowledge expressed in the following utterances: “I judge that television is bad for children”, “I doubt that he will come”, “I hope it will rain”, “I intend to be here at 12 o’clock”, “I have a toothache”, or “I believe that investing money in the steel industry produces excellent profits”. In this presentation, I want to contrast two approaches to first-person authority on beliefs. I will call the first one ‘the access position’, and I will call the second one ‘the authorship position’. Each of these positions can be stated in the following two broad claims:   (1) The access position. We have knowledge over our own beliefs because we enjoy an immediate (i.e., without relying on observations, perceptions or inferences) and reliable access to our own beliefs.   (2) The authorship position. We have knowledge over our own beliefs because we are the authors of our beliefs.