Human rights obligations of global governance institutions. A response to Cristina Lafont

MONTERO, JULIO

Buenos Aires

Simposio; Simposio Internacional: Democracia y derechos humanos en un mundo globalizado; 2012

Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Universidad Torcuato DiTella

In her paper "Human Rights and the Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions" Cristina Lafont defends three main related theses. The first thesis claims that, contrary to the view currently adopted by global governance institutions, these institutions do bear obligations for human rights. According to her, this does not mean that they must work to promote or fulfill human rights worldwide. It simply means that they must respect human rights by not adopting regulations that may seriously hamper their protection. In order to achieve this aim, global governance institutions should engage in an impact assessment of their policies and establish mechanisms for processing human rights complaints against the measures they recommend. Lafont´s second thesis claims that imposing human rights obligations to global governance institutions does not entail the creation of a world state or the dismantlement of the current states system. The reason for this is that, as long as states respect their obligation no to hamper the protection of human rights worldwide, they may continue to promote their national interest as strongly as they may want.Finally, Lafont´s third thesis is that in order to impose human rights obligations to global governance institutions, the state-centric conception of human rights that dominates current international politics must be replaced by an alternative, pluralist account. This pluralist account, which Lafont develops in other articles, ascribes obligations to respect human rights not only to states but also to non-state actors and makes them accountable to those people affected by their activities for honoring these obligations.I completely agree with Lafont´s first thesis. Global governance institutions do bear obligations for human rights, including an obligation to take into account the impact that their activities may have over the well being of persons and the satisfaction of human rights worldwide. I also agree with Lafont's second thesis. Imposing human rights obligations to global governance institutions does not entail the creation of a global state. However, I am not sure about Lafont´s third thesis. I admit that some version of the state-centric view is frequently used by the heads of global governance institutions and the representatives of affluent states to show that human rights are not their business. Yet I think that when seen in its best light the state-centric view may be perfectly compatible with imposing human rights obligations to these agents. Furthermore, I would say that the state-centric view may lead us to a better understanding of the nature of the human rights responsibilities of global governance institutions and other relevant international agents.