International obligations for human rights

JULIO MONTERO

Cordoba

Workshop; 3er Workshop de Ética, Política y Derecho; 2016

Centro de Estudios Jurídicos de la UNC

In this essay I suggest a philosophical account of the international obligations entailed by human rights, of their priority, and of their moral foundations. I will start by discussing two familiar strategies for justifying them. In view of their difficulties, I will proceed to propose an alternative view: the independence account. This conception regards human beings as enjoying a fundamental moral right to set and pursue their own aims without being subject to the arbitrary will of others, and interprets human rights norms as protecting this right from the activities of coercive institutions. After briefly explaining the implications of this conception at the national level, I will maintain that it generates two international obligations. The first one is a duty not to protect the sovereignty of offending regimes and to offer asylum to those whose human rights are in danger, whereas the second one is a duty to make sure that no state lacks the resources required for satisfying the human rights of their residents. Because compliance with these obligations is a necessary condition for the acceptability of the present international setup, their fulfillment takes priority over the promotion of the national interest and the achievement of domestic justice. When the international community fails to honor them, the global order renders illegitimate and lacks genuine moral authority over nations and individuals.