LARROSA Juan Manuel Ceferino
congresos y reuniones científicas
Circular Networks as Stable Nash Equilibria: Two Approaches
Bahía Blanca
Jornada; VI Jornada de Difusión de Investigaciones; 2003
Institución organizadora:
Instituto de Economía - Universidad Nacional del Sur
The paper analyzes a network formation problem, and in particular the existence of circular networks that constitute efficient Nash equilibria. We consider two ways in which they may arise as solutions. One is Bala and Goyal (BG)'s framework. In it an agent receives a payoff, which is increasing in the number of agents to which he is directly or indirectly connected, while it is decreasing in the number of agents to whom he is directly connected. The other approach departs from their assumptions in two crucial aspects. First, we assume that connecting to an agent pays off not only for the number of connections that the agent can provide but also for her intrinsic value. Second, we assume that each path connecting two agents has an associated cost which is the sum of the number of edges it includes, and which has to be paid by each agent in the path. In both approaches it is possible to obtain circular networks as efficient Nash equilibria. But, while in BG's approach this is only one possibility (the other is the empty network), in our approach, if the number of agents is larger than 3, it is the unique result.