The effect of in-group and out-group prescriptive norms in Dictator Game decisions: A test in the context of a presidential election

FREIDIN, E.; SENCI, C.M.; RYAN, B.; CARBALLO, FABRICIO

Wageningen

Congreso; Behavioural Insights in Research and Policy Making; 2016

SABE/IAREP

Background: Social norms have been shown toplay an ubiquitous role in Dictator Game (DG) decisions. For instance, whenparticipants estimate others? opinions about the most socially appropriatebehavior in the game (i.e., the prescriptive norm), they are more likely to choosethe equitable distribution (Krupka & Weber, 2009) or a distribution closerto the equity norm (Senci et al., in preparation) relative to a control group.  In thepresent study, we explored normative influences on DG decisions afterparticipants thought about in-group or out-group prescriptive norms in thecontext of the 2015 Argentine presidential election.  Others?group identity is supposed to be a key factor influencing people?s sensitivityto these others? opinions. On one hand, many theoretical developments (e.g.,Social Identity Theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1986; gene-culture co-evolution ofparochial altruism, Bowles et al., 2003) and empirical results (e.g., Bernhardet al., 2006; Baldasarri & Grossman, 2013) lead to expect in-group normativeopinions to have a stronger influence on behavior than out-group norms. Thiscould be so for many reasons such as people seeking to assert their socialidentity by following in-group norms or learning to expect punishment fromtransgression of such norms. From this view, we would expect DG decisions to becloser to the equity norm when participants estimate in-groups? than out-groups?normative opinions. On the other hand, reference to the out-group norm in the contextof an election might lead to social identity performance, namely behaviorsthat attempt to change the others? stereotypes and treatment of the in-group(Klein et al., 2007). Thisnotion is close to the idea of competitive altruism (Roberts, 1998), thoughapplied to concerns for the reputation of the group. From this view, we wouldexpect more pro-social decisions after participants estimate out-groups? thanin-groups? normative opinion. This prediction should stand in the pre-electioncontext when the reputation of the group can have strong consequences on the group?ssuccess, but not after the election when stakes are much lower.  Methods: We recruited 70 universitystudents (56% women) from a wide variety of disciplines (e.g., economics,psychology, biology, education, engineering, among others) in Bahía Blanca, Argentina,and we did a paper-and-pencil DG at the Universidad Nacional del Sur. We ran sessionsin a period involving a few weeks before and a few weeks after the 2015presidential ballotage that defined the election between candidates MauricioMacri (who was eventually elected) and Daniel Scioli. We defined the in-groupand the out-group based on participants? reported sympathy for eachpresidential candidate. All participants had to estimate previous participants?opinion about the most socially appropriate behavior in the DG before actuallyplaying the game for real money. In sessions both before and after the election,we implemented two independent treatments: 1) in treatment Macri (n=35),participants had to estimate Macri sympathizers? prescriptive norm beforemaking their decisions in the DG, whereas 2) in treatment Scioli (n=35),participants had to estimate Scioli sympathizers? prescriptive norm before playingthe game.   Results: Participants? estimation of theprescriptive norm was similar (close to the 50-50 split) regardless of whetherthey had to estimate the opinion of one or the other candidate sympathizers (Mann-WhitneyU test, Z=0.62, P=0.54). Nevertheless, those guessing the opinion of theright-wing-candidate sympathizers (i.e., Macri) made significantly more selfishdecisions than those guessing the opinion of the by-then-official-candidatesympathizers (i.e., Scioli) (Mann-Whitney U test, Z=2.32, P=0.02). Furthermore,for each participant, we built a score with the difference between his or herdegree of sympathy for one candidate and the other. This score was built sothat positive numbers indicated more sympathy towards the candidate whosesympathizers? opinion the participant had to estimate. Then, we dividedMacri-Scioli treatments in halves by the median of this candidate-sympathyscore to compare DG decisions of those that guessed the opinion of in-groups(Macri sympathizers that guessed Macri sympathizers? opinion, or Sciolisympathizers that guessed Scioli sympathizers? opinion) versus those thatguessed the opinion of out-groups (Macri sympathizers that guessed Sciolisympathizers? opinion, or Scioli sympathizers that guessed Macri sympathizers?opinion). This analysis showed that, before the election, participantsestimating the out-group norm chose in closer consistency with the equity norm (i.e.,less selfishly) than participants estimating the in-group norm (Mann-Whitney Utest, Z=2.43, P=0.015). This effect disappeared after the election (Mann-WhitneyU test, Z=0.17, P=0.86). In addition, participants estimating the out-groupnorm chose more altruistically before than after the election (Mann-Whitney Utest, Z=2.12, P=0.03).  Discussion: Present results showed that peoplefollow group norms in a flexible context-dependent manner. When groupcompetition for votes was at stake, participants behaved more pro-socially whenthought about the out-group than the in-group norm (despite both estimatednorms were similarly close to the fair share). Once the election was behind,there was no difference in DG decisions after thinking about the out-group orthe in-group. In addition, those thinking about the out-group chose morepro-socially before than after the election. These results are in stark contrastwith the idea that in-group norms are always more influential than out-groupnorms. Nonetheless, these data can still be interpreted as consistent with anunderlying motivation to impose the interests of the in-group. In particular, resultsare consistent with Klein and collaborators? (2007) notion of social identityperformance. Nonetheless, future studies should confirm whether participants?increased pro-sociality when reminded of the out-group norm was strategicallyunraveled to influence out-groups? opinion of the in-group.  Last butnot least, participants primed to think of the right-wing candidatesympathizers? norm chose more selfishly than participants who thought about theother candidate sympathizers? opinions. This result cannot be attributed todifferences in the estimated norm between the groups because there was no suchdifference. It seems plausible that reference to one and/or the other candidatemight have activated specific attitudes in relation to altruism andpro-sociality. This interpretation would be consistent with the associationfound between political (liberal vs. conservative) and social valueorientations (cooperative and pro-social vs. pro-self) (Van Lange et al.,2012).