The influence of prescriptive norms and negative externalities on bribery decisions in the lab

SENCI, C.M.; HASRUN, H.; MORO, R.; FREIDIN, E.

Rationality and Society

SAGE

Año: 2019

1043-4631

In mostBribery Games (BGs) in the literature, there is no mention of rights and dutiesassociated to participants´ roles. Authors have hitherto relied on loadedframes, negative externalities, and the possibility of sanctions to implicitlysignal prescriptive norms. We argue that participants´ interpretation of thesefactors may not be univocal. In the present study, a participant in the role ofa common citizen either did or did not acquire the right to obtain a monetarybenefit, and could offer a bribe to an associated participant in the role ofpublic official. This participant, in turn, had an explicit duty of providingthe benefit only if the citizen acquired the right to it. Conditionswith/without the acquisition of the right were crossed with the presence/absenceof negative externalities associated with transgressions of the official´sduty. One last (fifth) condition mimicked other BGs in the literature whichrely on loaded frames and negative externalities but no information on rightsand duties. We found that both the presence of externalities and informationabout rights were effective bribery deterrents, and that bribe offers andacceptances were most discouraged with their synergic effect. Interestingly,officials followed prescriptive information even when it was inefficient to doso (when there were no externalities), and implied choosing against theirmaterial self-interest (by rejecting a bribe), and not reciprocating bribeoffers. We conclude by highlighting the limits of making generalizations fromresults without explicit normative information, and the relevance of presentfindings as anti-corruption behavioral insights.