Moral Autonomy, Personal Autonomy and Human Rights in Carlos Nino

JUAN IOSA

Buenos Aires

Congreso; New readings of Kant?s Political Philosophy; 2019

CONICET-UBA

I am interested in rethinking the relationship between two key ideas within the Kantian tradition: those of moral autonomy and personal autonomy. Here I do it by reviewing the understanding that Carlos Nino offers us in Ethics and Human Rights. First I reconstruct his thought and then I try to show that Nino misunderstands that relationship. For him, the second is a subclass of the first: moral autonomy would refer to all moral duties, personal autonomy only to self-regarding duties. At the same time, he understands that moral autonomy (conceived as free acceptance of moral reasons) is a presupposition of the practice of moral discourse while personal autonomy (understood as free adoption of one's life plan) is a principle of social morality. But if the second is a subclass of the first (and here is my criticism) either moral autonomy is a principle of social morality or personal autonomy is a formal presupposition of the practice of moral discourse. No substantive moral principles can be derived from the formal presuppositions of a practice. Finally, I try to offer a tentative proposal on how we should conceive the relationship in question, a proposal that I believe is compatible with Kantian thinking on the subject.Nota: di mi conferencia en inglés pero el texto lo tengo en español, adjunto entonces la versión en español.