CONICET | Buscador de Institutos y Recursos Humanos

TS is a logic that has no valid inferences. But, could there be a logic without valid metainferences? We will introduce TSω, a logic without metainferential validities. Notwithstanding, TSω is not as empty as it can gets, because it has many antivalidities. We will later introduce the two-standard logic [TSω, STω], a logic without validities and antivalidities. Nevertheless, [TSω, STω] is still informative, because it has many contingencies. The three-standard logic [TSω,STω,[not-∅ ∅,∅ not-∅]] that we will further introduce, has no validities, no antivalidities and also no contingencies whatsoever. We will also present two more validity-empty logics. The ﬁrst one has no supersatisﬁabilities, unsatisfabilities and antivalidities∗. The second one has no invalidities nor non-valid-nor-invalid (meta)inferences. Finally, we will present an application of these logics to the the monism / pluralism / nihilism debate, and show how nihilism and monism, on one hand, and nihilism and pluralism, on the other hand, may reconcile?at least according to how Gillian Russell understands nihilism.