INVESTIGADORES
AROZAMENA Leandro Roberto
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism
Autor/es:
LEANDRO AROZAMENA; NICHOLAS SHUNDA; FEDERICO WEINSCHELBAUM
Lugar:
Universidad de Buenos Aires
Reunión:
Congreso; XLV Reunión Anual de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política; 2010
Institución organizadora:
Asociación Argentina de Economía Política - Universidad de Buenos Aires
Resumen:
In many auction settings, there is favoritism: the seller´s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. However, laws or regulations may not allow the seller to discriminate among bidders. We find the optimal nondiscriminatory auction in a private value, single-unit model under favoritism. At the optimal auction there is a reseve price, or an entry fee, which is decreasing in the proportion of prefered bidders and in the intensity of the preference. Otherwise, the highest-valuation bidder wins.
