INVESTIGADORES
AROZAMENA Leandro Roberto
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions
Autor/es:
LEANDRO AROZAMENA; FEDERICO WEINSCHELBAUM
Lugar:
Buenos Aires
Reunión:
Congreso; XXXIX Reunión Anual de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política; 2004
Institución organizadora:
Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, Universidad Católica Argentina
Resumen:
If the owner of an object sells it through an auction run by an agent of hers, corruption may appear. In a first-price auction, corruption can make honest bidders more or less aggressive, or their behavior can remain unchanged. We identify sufficient conditions for each of the three possibilities. We analyze the consequences of corruption on efficiency, bidders´ welfare and expected revenue, and study how it influences the number of bidders when participation is costly. Our results apply, as a particular case, to the situation -unrelated to corruption- where one of the bidders is granted a right of first refusal.
