Korsgaard y el Realismo Moral

GUILLERMO LARIGUET

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia

facultad de Filosofía Universidad Católica de Lisbosa, grupo Aletheia

Lugar: Lisboa; Año: 2019 vol. 75 p. 391 - 422

La revista se encuentra indexada en las siguientes plataformas de evaluación, identificación y/o impacto de revistas científicas: scopus,Erih Plus, The philosopher?s index, Jstor, De Gruyter, Ulrich?s Web, Cross Ref (Massachussets), Phil papers, Google Scholar, UCL, Répertoire bibliographique de la Philosophie, Latindex catálogo (México), International Philosophical Bibliography, Dialnet, Bibp, information en patristique (Laval, Canadá), Veritati (Repositorio de la Universidad Católica Portuguesa), Sherpa Romeo, Axioma, Ebsco Host, Miar. In this paper I would like to deal with a contemporary moral philosopher who, it could be said, expresses a ?Kantian resonance?. Strictly speaking, my work will be about Christine Korsgaard. More specifically, I want to focus on the specific criticism that Korsgaard addresses to a doctrine such as moral realism, taking into consideration,basically, her celebrated work The sources of normativity. With this purpose, first at all, I will offer a summary of the key ideas that define the philosophical proposal that Korsgaard defends about moral normativity. Second, I will reconstruct the main criticisms that Korsgaard directs against moral realism. Korsgaard, specifically, distinguishes a substantive moral realism from a procedural one.She argues that procedural moral realism is true, while substantive moral realism is nottrue. However, I will ask myself if, strictly speaking, Korsgaard does not conclude with theadmission, also, of a some kind of substantive moral realism.