INVESTIGADORES
TOHME Fernando Abel
artículos
Título:
Aggregation of Attack Relations: A Social-Choice Theoretical Analysis of Defeasibility Criteria
Autor/es:
TOHMÉ, FERNANDO; BODANZA, GUSTAVO; SIMARI, GUILLERMO
Revista:
LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE
Editorial:
Springer-Verlag
Referencias:
Lugar: Berlin, Alemania; Año: 2008 vol. 4932 p. 8 - 23
ISSN:
0302-9743
Resumen:
This paper analyzes the aggregation of different abstract attack
relations over a common set of arguments. Each of those attack
relations can be considered as the representation of a criterion
of warrant. It is well known in the field of Social Choice Theory that
if some fairness conditions are imposed over an
aggregation of preferences, it becomes impossible to yield a
result. When the criteria lead to acyclic attack relations, a
positive result may ensue under the same conditions, namely that if the
class of winning coalitions in
an aggregation process by voting is a proper prefilter
an outcome will exist. This outcome may preserve some features of the
competing attack relations, such as the highly desirable
property of acyclicity which can be associated with the
existence of a single extension of an argumentation system. The downside
of this is that, in fact, the resulting attack relation must be
a portion common to the hidden dictators in the system,
that is, all the attack relations that belong to all the
winning coalitions.