El Deber de Asistencia y el Deber Natural de Justicia

SELEME, HUGO OMAR

Barcelona, España.

Conferencia; Seminario de Filosofía del Derecho. Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Pompeu Fabra; 2005

Universidad Pompeu Fabra

The present work seeks to specify the requirements that follow from the Rawlsian duty of assistance.  In order to determine them, the hypothesis I will defend is that this duty, like the duty of just savings, is a specification of the natural duty of justice. This interpretation has three advantages: a) It facilitates the task of appreciating how one of the most important parts of the Rawlsian conception of justice in the international case presented in The Law of Peoples - the duty of assistance - is connected with the natural duty of justice presented in A Theory of Justice. b) It allows us to extend the requirements linked to the duty of assistance in directions that appear to be morally intuitive. Specifically, it sheds light on one of the most pressing problems nowadays: the foreign debt of developing countries. c) It allows us to better place Rawls in his dispute with the Cosmopolitans, because the new requirements that follow from the interpretation proposed are morally attractive and coincide with latter´s positions.