I-thoughts and I-concepts: a defence of Ezcurdia?s conception

ORLANDO, ELEONORA; PEREZ, DIANA INÉS

CDMX

Workshop; Homenaje a Maite Ezcurdia; 2019

IIF-UNAM

In the article ?Relativismo, coordinación y economía cognoscitiva? (2015), Maite Ezcurdia has defended the thesis that self-thoughts or I-thoughts (namely, self-conscious thoughts about one-self, also called ?de se thoughts?) involve I-concepts (namely, self-conscious representations of oneself). I-thoughts are a special kind of mental states about oneself, and, according to Maite, they are to be conceived as (a) states with a propositional (hence, conceptual) content, (b) involving a special kind of representation of oneself, namely, an I-concept. In this paper, we will briefly reconstruct some of her main arguments against Perry and Recanati who deny the Self-concept component in this kind of thoughts, and we will make manifest some original aspects of her position giving them further support.