INVESTIGADORES
PEREZ Diana Ines
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Conciencia fenoménica y habilidades mentalistas
Autor/es:
PEREZ, DIANA INÉS
Lugar:
DF
Reunión:
Congreso; Simposio: Lenguaje, mente y conocimiento. 40 años de Crítica; 2007
Institución organizadora:
UNAM-IIF
Resumen:
In this paper I consider recent discussions within the representationalist theories
of phenomenal consciousness, in particular, the discussions between first order
representationalism (FOR) and higher order representationalism (HOR). I aim to
show that either there is only a terminological dispute between them or, if the
discussion is not simply terminological, then HOR is based on a
misunderstanding of the phenomena that a theory of phenomenal consciousness
should explain. First, I argue that we can defend first order representationalism
from Carruthers? attacks and ignore higher order thoughts in our account of
phenomenal consciousness. Then I offer a diagnostic of Carruthers?
misunderstanding. In the last section I consider further reasons to include
mindreading abilities in an explanation of phenomenal consciousness.
(Se adjunta la versión definitiva publicada en Análisis Filosófico)
