Asymmetry and psychological concepts

PEREZ, DIANA INÉS

Atenas

Congreso; XXIII World Congress of Philosophy; 2013

FISP

There is a basic and widespread asymmetry between first person and third person attribution of psychological states. Let us consider some examples of mental attribution, comparing the first person (a-type case) with the corresponding third person (b-type case) attribution: (1a) I am in pain. vs. (1b) She is in pain; (2a) I am scared. vs. (2b) She is scared; (3a) I believe that the glass is on the table/that God exists. vs. (3b) She believes that the glass is on the table/ that God exists; (4a) I will go to the cinema next Saturday vs. (4b) She will go to the cinema next Saturday and (5a) I am brave vs. (5b) She is brave. It seems that we are not doing the same kind of thing when uttering the a-type of sentences than when uttering the b-type. What is exactly the difference between these two types of utterances is part of the question. Some people say that the difference is an epistemic one, because we are more certain, we do not doubt, we cannot be mistaken about a-type sentences when uttering them while we are not certain, we can doubt and we can be mistaken about b-type. Some other people say that the difference lies in the kind of action we are performing: in the a-type case we are expressing one?s own mind, in the b-type we are reporting someone else?s state of mind. Some other people would say that the difference lies in the grammar of personal pronouns (?I? vs ?She?). And still others would say that the asymmetry is due to the grammar of psychological concepts. In any case, a good theory about psychological attribution should explain this asymmetry. In the paper I explore the last option, (and reject all the others) defending the idea that there can not be given a unified account of the asymmetry for all the psychological concepts involevd in the examples.