Folk Psychology, psychological concepts and the second person

PEREZ, DIANA INÉS

Manhattan, Kansas

Conferencia; Conferencia en Kansas State University; 2013

Kansas State University, Philosophy Department

The purpose of this paper is to explore the 21st century discussion between the nonconceptual versions of FP and the old conceptual ones. I will try to motivate the view that a hybrid account is needed. My Theses are the following: 1.- FP is the set of ordinary/common sense psychological concepts we deploy in our ordinary life (in this sense the traditional view has a good point); 2.- These concepts (like many others) are grounded on nonconceptual social skills, which are constitutive part of them; 3.- We cannot understand FP if we only take into consideration the concepts of belief and desire and their relationships in order to understand human behavior, but we cannot understand human behavior if we only attend to nonconceptual practices and neglect the concept of belief (and other propositional attitude concepts). Plan of the paper: I. Outline of the received view: the classical opposition between TT and TS. II. Objections to the received view. (1) There are more psychological concepts which are relevant to understand human interaction than belief and desire: emotions and sensations, for example. (2) There are some cases where the explanation with psychological concepts seems inappropriate, because there is a simpler explanation without psychological concepts. III. The “third party” in the new approach to FP: the “second person perspective”. IV. Objections to the second person view. (1) This third party does not make room for psychological concepts. (2) In the paradigmatic cases mentioned by this view there are psychological concepts involved after all. V. On the proper understanding of the relation between conceptual and nonconceptual mind reading abilities.