Modeling the centolla-fishermen system dynamics

ZAMBRANO, A; LAGUNA, MARIA FABIANA; KUPERMAN, MARCELO N.; NAHUELHUAL, LAURA; MONJEAU, ADRIAN; LATERRA, PEDRO

Buenos Aires

Congreso; 103ª Reunión Nacional de Física de la AFA; 2018

AFA

In this paper we present a model of competition between legally registered fishing vessels to exploit Centolla fisheries in southern Chile in the presence of illegal fishermen. The model couples elements of game theory with complex networks and difierential equations. A fisherman can choose to stay within the law or join these illegal fishermen and become a super-fisherman. The profit of each fisherman depends on the strategy chosen, the presence of illegals (included as a mean-field) and the surrounding competing vessels. A legal fisherman can shift to a super-fisherman strategy when he receives in his boat crabs obtained by illegal fishermen who seek to launder their fishing. To represent the architecture of competitive interactions between registered fishers, network theory was used. The nodes of the network represent the legal vessels and the links between nodes indicate that these vessels compete with each other for the local resource of Centolla, supposedly finite and evenly distributed. The decision to change (or not) the strategy taken by the boat is given based on the temptation to super-fishing or the social/moral pressure to stop doing so. For the reproductive dynamics of the Centolla, an Allee type model with extraction that comes from the fishermen system was used. For this extraction, the fishing/closed season typical of the fishing activity were considered.