CONICET | Buscador de Institutos y Recursos Humanos

This work contributes to understanding the challenges for the governance ofaccess to provision ecosystem services in semi-open fisheries, by applying amodel that couples game theory with complex networks and differentialequations. We present an agent-based model of competition between registeredand unregistered fishing ships for the extraction of Chilean king crab (Lithodessantolla) and their impact on the survival or extinction of this species. Eachfisher behaves legally or become a super-fisher, whitewashing the captures ofunregistered fishers. The profit of each fisher depends on the strategies chosenby all the players and on the presence of illegal fishers. To model the profitdynamics of each agent, we frame our work within game theory, and torepresent the architecture of competitive interactions between registeredfishers, we use network theory. The decision to change (or not) the fishingstrategy was modeled taking in account that the fishers were subjected totemptation to whitewash or to a social / moral pressure to stop doing so. Forthe reproductive dynamics of the king crab, an Allee type model with extraction,that comes from the fishers activity, was used. For this extraction, we consider afishing / closure cycle, typical of the fishing activity. In our results we found thatthe choice of properly distributed cycles or setting an extraction limit per vessellead to sustainable fishing in regions; the selfish option of maximizingindividual profit is unsustainable and leads to the collapse of the system, aspostulated in The Tragedy of the Commons hypothesis. These results could helpto make governance decisions on what to do in order to avoid the collapse of thisfisher activity. The sustainable governance of the system and the monitoring ofits compliance is an indispensable requirement to avoid the collapse of theresource.

enviar mensaje