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This paper intends to address the problem of normativity and its relation with valuation in John Dewey´s and C. I. Lewis? points of view. This topic has been discussed by the pragmatists themselves as a result of some objections put forward by their colleagues M.G. White and R. Browning. The critics not only suggest that pragmatists hold conflicting positions, but also that their respective proposals fail to achieve an accurate conception of the validity of ethical norms. Browning regards the lewisian perspective as a heretic pragmatism, but one that constitutes a step forward in asserting a logical and methodological discontinuity between questions of valuation and questions of ethics. According to Browning, such a position would allow Lewis to clarify something that Dewey fails to render explicit, i. e., the distinctively ethical dimension. However, Browning considers that Lewis? proposal does not succeed either. In the same vein, White (1949) states that Dewey does not offer a convincing account of the normative character of ethical judgments and that Lewis, in doing so, fails to consistently articulate his ethical conception with his theory of knowledge. Thus, White concludes that pragmatism has no solution for the fundamental problem of ethics.In this article we intent to establish some points of departure that will allow us to discuss White's conclusion and maintain, on the contrary, that classical pragmatism provides, indeed, an interesting and fruitful response to the problem of the foundations of ethical norms and values. In order to accomplish our goal, we will analyze the objections put forward by White and Browning, on the one hand, and the comments that Lewis makes with regard to Dewey´s conception of valuation, on the other. It is worth taking into account that Lewis? comments have been interpreted by many scholars as a sign of an almost complete dissociation of his ideas with respect to pragmatism. Indeed, Lewis introduces a distinction between the good and the correct, distinction that he considers fundamental for the analysis in question, but that, according to him, has been omitted by the rest of the pragmatists. Thus, in ?Pragmatism and the roots of the moral? (Lewis, C.I., 1969, pp. 103-125) the philosopher points particularly at William James, observing that he confuses ?good? with ?correct? (Lewis, 1969, p. 106) and adds that Dewey himself commits a similar error in overlooking the difference (Lewis, 1970, p. 76). However, in the present article we intend to uphold that, despite there been certain dissimilarity between Lewis? and Dewey`s proposals, they do not represent a substantial disagreement but a difference of emphasis. In this sense, we consider inaccurate to distinguish between a pragmatism that is consistent but wrong, represented by Dewey, and a better-oriented but inconsistent and heretical pragmatism, represented by Lewis. Instead, we believe that both proposals might complement each other so as to offer an interesting and promising conception of normativity; one that, following Esteban, can be called normative naturalism (Esteban & Martínez, 2008, p. 121-200). From our point of view, such a position contains a fruitful conception of norms and values which has not been sufficiently explored and that is particularly interesting when considering the problem of the relation between knowledge and science. This normative naturalism enables us not only to highlight the role of values in scientific practice, but also to delineate a philosophy of knowledge that gives us the basis for a critical assessment of the values and norms that guide scientific research.