A review of Morton White's criticism concerning Clarence Irving Lewis' theory of valuation and normativity

SÁNCHEZ GARCÍA VICTORIA PAZ

Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia

Educ

Lugar: Sao Paulo; Año: 2017 vol. 18 p. 259 - 272

2316-5278

This paper presents an examination of the critiques put forward by Morton White in his article ?Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis? (1949), particularly those directed upon C. I. Lewis? conception of normativity and valuation. The critic states that Lewis, in offering an account of the normative character of ethical judgements, fails to consistently articulate his ethical conception with his theory of knowledge. This leads White to conclude that the pragmatist has no solution for the fundamental problem of ethics. I will argue that such conclusion is wrong. The kernel of my argumentation rests in the thesis that White?s criticism stems from an inaccurate interpretation of Lewis? conceptualist pragmatism, one that fails to acknowledge the pragmatic apriorism which is the key to a proper understanding of his theory of knowledge and to an explanation of the connection and articulation between valuation and normativity within Lewis? framework. In this line, I will show that, quite on the contrary, Lewis? epistemology highlights his ethical and normative developments, revealing a naturalistic theory of valuation that is the basis upon which normativity pragmatically emerges. I will also maintain that this perspective offers a fruitful conception of values and norms which has not been sufficiently explored; one that confronts ethical skepticism, that can account for the cognitive status of values and norms, and that reclaims the rational character of valuation not only for ethics but also for knowledge and science.